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Acronyms
• Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
• Block random access memory (BRAM)
• Block Triple Modular Redundancy (BTMR)
• Clock (CLK or CLKB)
• Combinatorial logic (CL)
• Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
• Constant false alarm rate filter (CFAR)
• Device under test (DUT)
• Digital Signal Processing Block (DSP)
• Distributed triple modular redundancy (DTMR)
• Dual interlocked storage cell (DICE)
• Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
• Error detection and correction (EDAC)
• Error rate (dE/dt )
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Finite impulse response filter (FIR)
• Gate Level Netlist (EDF, EDIF, GLN)
• Global triple modular redundancy (GTMR)
• Input – output (I/O)
• INV (inverter)
• Linear energy transfer (LET)
• Local triple modular redundancy (LTMR)
• Look up table (LUT)
• Mean fluence to failure (MFTF)
• Mean Time to Failure (MTTF)
• Operational frequency (fs)
• Power on reset (POR)
• Place and Route (PR)
• Probability of flip-flop upset (PDFFSEU →SEU)
• Probability of logic masking (Plogic)
• Probability of transient generation (Pgen)
• Probability of transient capture (P(fs)SET→SEU)
• Probability of transient propagation (Pprop)
• Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)
• Single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
• Single event effects (SEEs)
• Single event latch-up (SEL)
• Single event transient (SET)
• Single event upset (SEU)
• Single event upset cross-section (σSEU)
• Static random access memory (SRAM)
• System on a chip (SOC)
• Time delay (τdelay)
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• Transient width (τwidth)
• Universal Serial Bus (USB)
• Virtex-5QV (V5QV)
• Windowed Shift Register (WSR)
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• Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Devices: Challenges for 
Critical Applications and Space Radiation Environments.
• Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA configuration
• Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA data paths
• Fail-Safe Strategies for Critical Applications.
Agenda 
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FPGA Devices: Challenges for Critical 
Applications and Space Radiation 
Environments
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Motivation: Concerns for using FPGA 
Devices in Critical Applications
• Safety: can circuits or 
humans be damaged or hurt?
• Reliability : will the device 
operate as expected?
• Availability: Includes down-
time… is it acceptable?
• Recoverability: if the device 
malfunctions, can the system 
come back to a working 
state?
• Trust: Will the insertion of the 
device compromise security?
Critical applications expect to 
avoid disaster when disaster is 
probable.
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How To Protect A System from Failure
• Always take into account mission requirements.
• Investigate failure modes – understand risk:
– Reliability testing (temperature, voltage, mechanical, and logic 
switching stresses).
– Radiation testing: Single event effects (SEE) and total ionizing 
dose (TID).
• Wisely add redundancy:
– Replication with correction.
– Replication with detection.  Requires recovery:
• Switch to another device,
• Try to recover state,
• Start over,
• Alert,
• Do nothing… die.
• Add filtration: e.g., Finite impulse response (FIR) filters or 
Constant false alarm rate filter (CFAR).
• Add masking: Protect system operation from failures.
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Characterizing SEUs: Radiation Testing 
and SEU Cross Sections
Terminology:
• Flux: Particles/(sec-cm2)
• Fluence: Particles/cm2
σseu is calculated at several LET values 
(particle spectrum). 
Mean fluence to failure (MFTF) is the inverse 
of σseu.
SEU Cross Sections (σseu) characterize how many upsets will occur based 
on the number of ionizing particles to which the device is exposed.
Heavy-ion testing at Texas A&M 
University
MFTF = 1
σseu
σseu = #errors
fluence
fluence
errors
seu
#
=σ
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SEU Test Procedure and MFTF
• Create design to be placed in 
FPGA device under test (DUT).
• Create tester.  Provides stimuli 
and monitors DUT responses to 
beam exposure.
• Select energy, particle, and 
particle LET (if beam cocktail is 
heavy-ions).
• Expose DUT to beam.
• Monitor DUT response for 
unexpected behavior. Visibility 
is key and extremely 
challenging.
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FPGA SEU Cross Section Model
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CLBs BRAM GR 
Control
Hard
IP
Configurable logic block: (CLB) 
Block random access memory: (BRAM)
Intellectual property: (IP); e.g., micro processors, digital signal processor blocks (DSP), embedded state machines, etc,…
Global Routes: (GR)
Analog circuits
Complex 
routing logic 
everywhere.
Design σSEU Configuration σSEU Functional logic 
σSEU
SEFI σSEU
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Preliminary Design Considerations for 
Mitigation And Trade Space
• Does the designer need to add 
mitigation?
• Will there be compromises?
– Performance and speed,
– Power,
– Schedule
– Mitigating the susceptible 
components?
– Reliability (working and mitigating 
as expected)?
Determine Most Susceptible Components:
Impact to speed, power, area, reliability, and 
schedule are important questions to ask.
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Single Event Upsets and FPGA 
Configuration
Pconfiguration+P(fs)functionalLogic+PSEFI
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FPGA Configuration Implementation and 
SEU Susceptibility 
(There are a variety of FPGA configuration types)
ANTIFUSE (one time programmable)
SRAM (reprogrammable)
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Configuration SEU Test Results and 
the REAG FPGA SEU Model
FPGA 
Configuration
Type
REAG Model
𝑷𝑷(𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇)𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆
Antifuse
SRAM (non-
mitigated)
Flash
Hardened SRAM
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Table shows the most significant SEE responses during accelerated 
radiation testing.
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What Does The Last Slide Mean?
FPGA 
Configuration 
Type
Susceptibility
Data-path: Combinatorial Logic (CL) and Flip-flops (DFFs); 
Global: Clocks and Resets;
Configuration
Antifuse Configuration has been designated as hard regarding SEEs.  
Susceptibilities only exist in the data paths and global routes.  
However, global routes are hardened and have a low SEU 
susceptibility.
SRAM (non-
mitigated)
Configuration has been designated as the most susceptible portion 
of circuitry.  All other upsets (except for global routes) are too 
statistically insignificant to take into account.  E.g., it is a waste of 
time to study data path transients, however clock transient studies 
are significant.
Flash Configuration has been designated as hard (but NOT immune) regarding 
SEEs.  Susceptibilities also exist in the data paths and global routes (e.g., 
clocks and resets).  
Hardened
SRAM
Configuration has been designated as hardened (but NOT hard) 
regarding SEEs.  Susceptibilities also exist in the data paths and 
global routes (e.g., clocks and resets).  
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Take Note: Configuration SRAM is NOT 
Utilized the Same Way as Traditional SRAM
LOGIC LOGIC
LOGIC LOGIC
B1 B2 B3 B4 Bi Bi+1Bi+2 Bi+3
B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B
• Direct connections from 
configuration to user 
logic.
• Upset occurs in an 
actively used 
configuration bit then, 
upset occurs in logic.
Every active, used bit can instantaneously 
cause an unexpected effect
No Read-Write cycle required!
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Example: Routing Configuration 
Upsets in a Xilinx Virtex FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Look Up Table: 
LUT
One configuration bit flip can cause significant malfunction.  
Mitigate appropiately.
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Fixing SRAM-based 
Configuration…Scrubbing Definition
• We address configuration susceptibility via 
scrubbing: Scrubbing is the act of simultaneously 
writing into FPGA configuration memory as the 
device’s functional logic area is operating with 
the intent of correcting configuration memory bit 
errors.
Configuration scrubbing only pertains to SRAM-based 
configuration devices.
17
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Scrubbers: Internal versus External
• Internal and external scrubbers are implemented to 
correct configuration bit-flips:
– Internal scrubber: is created out of hard cores 
that reside inside the FPGA device; or is created 
out of user fabric logic blocks located inside the 
FPGA device.
– External scrubber is implemented in an separate 
device .
• Typically, external scrubbers are implemented in 
anti-fuse FPGA or flash-based FPGAs.
• Internal scrubbers are more susceptible than 
external scrubbers.
18
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Scrubbers: When Reality Defies Theory
• Internal scrubbers are expected to provide satisfactory 
results in proton environments.
– Clocks are not highly susceptible to protons because of their high 
drive strength.
– Most of the logic used to implement the scrubber is embedded.
– Scrubber should not require a large amount of circuitry.
• Note: Proton radiation testing of the Intel Cyclone 10 
showed the device’s internal scrubber does not work as 
expected. 
– Scrubber failed to remain operable with a fluence of 1×108
100MeV particles.
– Results are unexpected.
• Implementation of the scrubber means everything!
– Did Intel use a processor based internal scrubber?
– Use of memory will cause the scrubber to be more susceptible 
than expected.
19
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
Warning!
• Correcting a configuration bit does not mean that you have 
fixed the state in the functional logic path.
• In order to guarantee that the functional logic is in the 
expected state after the configuration bit is fixed, either the 
state must be restored or a reset must be issued. 
Reliably getting to an expected state after a 
configuration-bit SEU (that affects the design’s 
functionality) requires one of the following:
– Fix configuration bit + (reset or correct DFFs) or
– Full reconfiguration.
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Example: Routing Configuration 
Upsets in a Xilinx Virtex FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Look Up Table: 
LUT
Configuration + design state must be corrected after a configuration 
SEU hit.
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Single Event Upsets in an FPGA’s Functional 
Data Path and Fail-Safe Strategies
Pconfiguration+P(fs)functionalLogic+PSEFI
22
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Data-path SEUs and Their Affect At 
The System Level
• Each data path in an FPGA device is a cascade of sequential and 
combinatorial logic.
• SEUs are asynchronous events that usually occur between clock 
edges(during system next-state calculation): A system-level 
malfunction occurs if the event forces the system’s next state to 
be incorrect.
• The occurrence of an SET or SEU does not definitively cause 
system error.
• Probability of system malfunction is second order:
– Probability that a transistor will unexpectedly change its state
• Energy of particle
• Type of particle
– Probability that the changed state will cause the system to 
malfunction
• Is the transistor in an active path?
• Will its change of state be masked by other components? 
23
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Error Propagation in A Data-Path: 
SEU De-rating
• Capacitive filtration: data-path capacitance can stop transient upset 
propagation; e.g.: 
– Routing metal or heavy loading.  
– If a transient doesn’t reach a sequential element, then it most likely will 
not cause a system upset.
• Logic masking: 
– Redundancy and mitigation of paths can stop upset propagation.
– Turned off paths from gated logic can stop upset propagation.
• Temporal delay: path delays can block temporary SEUs from 
disturbing next state calculation.
24
Synchronous design was created because of the noise 
that is generated during transistor switching.  This 
design topology also helps in de-rating SET capture.
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Data-path SEU Susceptibility and 
Analysis : the NASA Electronics Parts 
and Packaging (NEPP) FPGA Model
Berg M.,” FPGA SEE Test Guidelines”, NASA Radiation Effects 
and Analysis Group Website: 
https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/23779/FPGA_Radiation_Test_Guide
lines_2012.pdf, July 2012.
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Incorrect DFF-States from SEUs
DFFk Cone of Logic
26
EndPoint DFF SEUs + StartPoint DFF SEUs + CL SETs
DFF upsets that 
occur at the clock 
edge.
DFF upsets that occur 
between clock edges and 
are captured by 
EndPoints.
Single Event 
Transients 
captured by 
EndPoints.
Make a clear distinction between 
DFF SEUs based on Clock state 
and Capture.
DFFs have various means of 
reaching a bad state due to SEUs.
System malfunction 
is not definitive with 
Wrong DFF State 
Every DFF has a 
cone of logic.
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0
1
1
0
1
StartPoint DFF SEU Capture
If DFFD flips its state @ time=τ:
0<τ <τclk −τdly
The upset has time to get caught…
Probability of capture: 1- (τdly/τclk)
27
1
0???
τclk@T-1
τclk@T
TT-1 T+1
τdly τclk
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Percentage of Clock Cycle for SEU Capture:
dlyclk τττ −<
clk
dly
clk
dlyclk
clk τ
τ
τ
ττ
τ
τ
−=
−
< 1
fsfs dlyττ −<1
Upset is caught within 
this timeframe.
Fraction of clock 
period for upset 
capture.
Upset capture with respect 
to frequency.
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Details of Capturing StartPoint DFFs
• SEU generation occurs in a StartPoint between rising clock edges 
(βP(fs)DFFSEU) 
• StartPoint upsets can be logically masked by logic between the 
StartPoint and its EndPoint
• Design topology and temporal effects:
– Increase path delay (# of gates) – decrease probability of capture
– Increase frequency – decrease probability of capture
29
Upset generated 
internally to DFF 
between clock edges Design Topology and Temporal Masking
SEU will not be 
logically masked
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
0
1
1
0
1
Synchronous System: CL SET Capture
30
0???
SET
τwidth
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Details of CL SET Capture in a 
Synchronous System: P(fs)DFFSET
• SET Generation (Pgen) occurs between clock edges 
• EndPoint DFF captures the SET at a clock edge
– Increase frequency – increase probability of capture.
– Increase CL  – increase probability of capture.
– Increase LET – increase the width of the SET.
31
SET is Generated
Width of SET 
relative to clock 
period
SET will not be 
logically masked
Propagation:
SET can propagate 
through electrical medium 
(routes and gates) and 
reach the End-Point
τclk
τwidth
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NEPP FPGA Model: Putting it All Together … 
Analyzed Per Particle LET (as would be done for SEU 
Cross-sections)
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EndPoint
StartPoints
CL
EndPoint
Logic 
Masking
Frequency # of Gates in Path
EndPoint Directly Proportional N/A
StartPoint Inversely Proportional Inversely Proportional
CL Directly Proportional Directly Proportional
Table: Component Contribution to σSEU across Frequency and Gate Count
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Clock Trees and SETs
• Examples only considered data paths.
• However, clock and reset trees (global routes) are 
susceptible to SETs
• Clock trees in ASICs and FPGAs are the most 
overlooked mechanism of failure due to 
ionization.
• Global route susceptibilities must be taken into 
account when determining system risk.
• Global route susceptibilities are different for each 
FPGA device.
33
There is not much a user can do to mitigate clock 
tree SETs.  However, it is imperative to know 
susceptibilities – probability of occurrence and 
ass ciated error sig atures.
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Fail-safe Strategies for Data-Path 
Single Event Upsets (SEUs)
• The following slides will demonstrate commonly used 
mitigation strategies for FPGA devices.
• What you should learn:
– The differences between mitigation strategies.
– Strengths and weaknesses of various strategies.
– Questions to ask or considerations to make when 
evaluating mitigation schemes.
– Which mitigation schemes are best for various 
types of FPGA devices.
• The scope of this presentation will cover fail-safe 
strategies for configuration and data-path SEUs
34
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
Goal for critical 
applications: 
Limit the probability 
of system error 
propagation and/or 
provide detection-
recovery 
mechanisms via 
fail-safe strategies. 
Fail-Safe Strategies for FPGA 
Critical Applications
35
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Differentiating Fail-Safe Strategies:
• Detection:
– Watchdog (state or logic monitoring).
– Can range from simplistic checking to complex Decoding.
– Action (alerting, correction, or recovery).
• Masking (does not mean correction):
– Preventing error propagation to other logic.  
– Requires redundancy + mitigation or detection.
– Turn off faulty path.
• Correction (error may not be masked):
– Error state (memory) is changed/fixed.
– Need feedback or new data flush cycle.
• Recovery:
– Bring system to a deterministic state.
– Might include correction.
36
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Redundancy Is Not Enough
• Simply adding redundancy to a system is not enough 
to assume that the system is well protected.
• Questions/Concerns that must be addressed for a 
critical system expecting redundancy to cure all (or 
most):
– How is the redundancy implemented?
– What portions of your system are protected? Does the 
protection comply with the results from radiation testing?
– Is detection of malfunction required to switch to a redundant 
system or to recover?
– If detection is necessary, how quickly can the detection be 
performed and responded to?
– Is detection enough?... Does the system require correction?
Listed are crucial concerns that should be addressed at 
design reviews and prior to design implementation
37
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Mitigation
• Mitigation can be:
– User inserted: part of the actual design process.
• User must verify mitigation… Complexity is a RISK!!!!!!!!
– Embedded: built into the device library cells.
• User does not verify the mitigation – manufacturer does.
• EXPENSIVE.
• Mitigation should reduce error…
– Generally through redundancy and correction.
– Incorrect implementation can increase error.
– Overly complex mitigation cannot be verified and 
incurs too high of a risk to implement.
38
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Embedded Mitigation versus User 
Inserted Mitigation
39
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Radiation Hardened (per SEU) versus 
Commercial FPGA Devices
• For this presentation, a radiation hardened (per SEU) 
device is a device that has embedded mitigation.
• Radiation hardened FPGA devices are available to 
users.  They make the design cycle much easier!
• SEU mitigation is generally applied to the following:
– Data-path elements:
• Localized redundancy inserted into library cell flip-flops 
(DFFs).
– Localized Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR) or
– Dual interlocked Cell (DICE)
• SET filters inserted on the DFF data input pin.
• SET filters inserted on the DFF clock input pin.
– Global routes.
– Memory cells.
40
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Localized Redundancy Embedded in 
Manufacturer DFF Cells
41
Dual Interlocked Cell (DICE) Localized Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR)
Xilinx Microsemi
Warning! These figures are simplified schematics of the actual 
implementation.
Problem! Although DFFs are protected, SETs from the 
combinatorial logic in the data path and SETs in the global 
routes can cause incorrect data to be captured by the DFF.
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Combinatorial 
logic data path TR Filter
Embedded Temporal Redundancy (TR): SET 
Filtration in The Data Path
DFF
Q
QSET
CLR
DVO
T
E
R
t1
t2
• Temporal Filter placed directly before DFF.
• Localized scheme that reduces SET capture in the data path.
• Delays must be well controlled.  
– Every delay path shall consistently have a predefined delay and must 
be verified.
• Do not implement TR as a user inserted mitigation scheme. Delay 
must be deterministic and it is too difficult to manage with place 
and route tools.
• Maximum Clock frequency is reduced by the amount of new delay.
42
DFF CELLCrude example 
of TR 
implementation
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Embedded Radiation Hardened Global Routes:
SET Filtration in The Global Route Path
• Some FPGAs contain 
radiation-hardened clock 
trees and other global routes 
(Microsemi products only).
• Global structures are 
generally hardened by using 
larger buffers.
• TR has also been used on 
the DFF clock pin… (Xilinx 
V5QV only).
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Clock Tree
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Global route susceptibility is often overlooked.  Beware, 
many devices do not have hardened global routes.
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
FPGA Devices and Manufacturer Embedded 
Mitigation
Configuration Type Short List of 
Device Families
Embedded 
Mitigation
Most Susceptible 
Components
SRAM Stratix, Virtex, 
Kintex
No Configuration and 
clock trees
Antifuse RTAX, RTSXS DFFs and clocks 
(configuration is 
already hardened by 
nature)
Combinatorial logic 
(however 
susceptibility
considered low)
Flash ProASIC3,RTG4,
SmartFusion(2)
Configuration is 
already hardened by 
nature.
ProASIC3 and 
SmartFusion: DFFs 
and clocks; RTG4: 
clocks and SETs
Hardened SRAM Virtex V5QV Configuration + 
DICE DFFs + SET 
filters
Clocks.  In some 
cases additional 
mitigation may be 
necessary for 
configuration and 
DFFs
44
Go to http://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov, manufacturer 
websites, and other space agency sites for more 
information on SEU data and total ionizing dose data.
DFF: flip flop DICE: Dual interlocked Cell
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User Inserted Mitigation:
Flushing, Dual Redundancy, Cold Sparing, and 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
45
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Most Commonly Implemented System 
Level Mitigation:
Reset or Flush
• Critical applications require all registers (flip-flops) 
to be connected to a reset.
• A reset is used to force the system to a known 
(expected) state in a deterministic time period.
• All elements are expected to be able to operate from 
the reset state.  However:
– For some FPGAs, a reset is not enough.  The configuration 
might also have to be flushed (reconfigure or scrub).
– Availability is affected.
– Next state information during event is most likely lost.
– All must be taken into account when determining the effect 
of activating a reset in a system.
46
Warning: Resets are susceptible to SEEs 
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Dual Redundancy
• Dual redundant systems cannot correct (roll-back is an 
exception); they can only detect.
• “Compare and Alert” systems must be highly reliable 
and verifiable.
• Generally not all I/O can be monitored or compared.
• Best used for data calculation and manipulation… 
easiest to place compares on data buses.
• Can run in lockstep or free running.
47
Complex System
Complex System
Compare
Alert, Mask,
And Recover
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Cold Sparing: Elongation of System 
Operation
• One active system and alternate inactive systems.
• Upon active system failure, an inactive system is turned 
on.
• System operation is able to be elongated after failure.
• However:
– Availability is affected… there is downtime.
– Can your system afford the downtime (critical application)?
– How clean is the system switch over?
– How long is the system switch over.
• Can the system ping-pong between active and inactive 
systems or is a system considered dead after failure?
– Ping-ponging can be used for systems that have a low 
probability of destructive failures.
– Ping-ponging can be complex and can affect availability.
48
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System versus Design Mitigation
• The previous slides were affiliated with system level 
mitigation.
• System level mitigation generally has:
– Detection, masking, no correction, downtime, and recovery 
actions.
• The following slides will discuss triple modular 
redundancy (TMR) techniques that can be 
implemented as system or design-level mitigation.
• Most of the TMR techniques will incorporate masking 
and detection with no downtime (unless there is a 
single functional interrupt (SEFI)). 
• Hence, TMR can improve system performance, 
availability, and elongate operation time.
49
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Mitigation – Fail Safe Strategies That 
Do Not Require Fault Detection but 
Provide SEU Masking and/or 
Correction: 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)… 
best two out of three.
50
Voter
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
How To Insert TMR into A Design:
FPGA User Design Flow
Create 
Configuration
Place and Route
Output of 
synthesis is a 
gate netlist that 
represents the 
given HDL 
function.
Functional 
Specification
HDL
Synthesis
HDL: Hardware description language
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TMR can be 
inserted during 
synthesis or post 
synthesis.
If inserted post 
synthesis, the gate 
level netlist is 
replicated, ripped 
apart, and voters + 
feedback are 
inserted.
TMR can be written 
into the HDL.  
Generally not done 
because too 
difficult.
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Local Mitigation versus Distributed or 
Global Mitigation
• Local mitigation: 
– Only DFFs are mitigated.
– Mitigation will include masking and potential correction 
at the DFF.
– Used with systems where DFFs are the most susceptible 
component cells.
• Distributed or global mitigation:
– The full design is mitigated with masking and 
correction.
• Depending on the target device, the clock tree 
and other global routes may also need hardening. 
52
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Various TMR Schemes: Different Topologies
53
Block diagram of block 
TMR (BTMR): a complex 
function containing 
combinatorial logic (CL) 
and flip-flops (DFFs) is 
triplicated as three 
black boxes; majority 
voters are placed at the 
outputs of the triplet. 
Block diagram of local 
TMR (LTMR): only flip-
flops (DFFs) are 
triplicated and data-
paths stay singular; 
voters are brought into 
the design and placed 
in front of the DFFs. 
Block Diagram of 
distributed TMR (DTMR): 
the entire design is 
triplicated except for the 
global routes (e.g., clocks); 
voters are brought into the 
design and placed after the 
flip-flops (DFFs).  DTMR 
masks and corrects most 
single event upsets (SEUs). 
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TMR Implementation
• As previously illustrated, TMR can be implemented in a 
variety of ways.
• The definition of TMR depends on what portion of the 
circuit is triplicated and where the voters are placed.
• The strongest TMR implementation will triplicate all 
data-paths and contain separate voters for each data-
path.
– However, this can be costly: area, power, and 
complexity.
– Hence a trade is performed to determine the TMR 
scheme that requires the least amount of effort and 
circuitry that will meet project requirements.
• Presentation scope: Block TMR (BTMR), Localized TMR 
(LTMR), Distributed TMR (DTMR), Global TMR (GTMR).
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Block Triple Modular Redundancy: BTMR
• Need Feedback to Correct.
• Cannot apply internal correction from voted outputs.
• If blocks are not regularly flushed (e.g. reset), Errors 
can accumulate – may not be an effective technique.
V
O
T
I
N
G
M
A
T
R
I
X
Complex 
function 
with 
DFFs
Can Only 
Mask 
Errors
Copy 1
Copy 2
Copy 3
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Most common way to 
TMR IP Cores.
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Examples of a Flushable BTMR 
Designs
• Shift Registers.
• Transmission channels:  It is typical for 
transmission channels to send and reset after 
every sent packet.
• Systems that can be reset (or power-cycled) 
every so-often.
Voter
TRANSMIT
TRANSMIT
TRANSMIT
RESET
Transmission channel example:
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Reliablity across Fluence: Simplex 
System versus BTMR Version
System No TMR
BTMR System
Explanation of BTMR Strength and Weakness 
using Classical Reliability Models
Operating a BTMR 
design in this time 
interval will provide 
an increase in 
reliability.
However, over time, 
BTMR reliability drops 
off faster than a 
system with No TMR.
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Relibility for 1 
block (Rblock)
Relibility for 
BTMR (RBTMR)
Mean Time to 
Failure for 1 
block (MTTFblock)
Mean Time to 
Failure BTMR 
(MTTFBTMR)
e- λt 3 e- 2λt-2 e- 3λt 1/ λ (5/6 λ)= 0.833/λ
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BTMR Bottom Line
• How long does your BTMR system need to 
operate relative to the MTTF for one of its 
unmitigated blocks?
• Overtime, a BTMR system has lower reliability 
than an unmitigated system.
• Adding more replicated blocks (e.g., N-out-of-M) 
system will only increase the reliability during the 
short window near start time.  However, overtime, 
the reliability of an N-out-of-M system will fall 
faster as M (the number of replicated blocks) 
grows.
• Benefit!!!!  BTMR can block an error from 
propagating to other areas of the system.
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Warning
• With BTMR, not all I/O can be monitored.
• Usually need an additional detection signal to 
know when one of the systems are in failure.
• Need stop upon first system failure and correct 
system state.
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What Should be Done If Availability 
Needs to be Increased?
• If the blocks within the BTMR have a relatively high upset 
rate with respect to the availability window, then stronger 
mitigation must be implemented.
• Bring the voting/correcting inside of the modules… bring 
the voting to the module DFFs.
The following slides illustrate the various forms of TMR that 
include voter insertion in the data-path.
TMR 
Nomenclature
Description TMR 
Acronym
Local TMR DFFs are triplicated LTMR
Distributed TMR DFFs and CL-data-paths are 
triplicated
DTMR
Global TMR DFFs, CL-data-paths and global 
routes are triplicated
GTMR or 
XTMR
DFF: Edge triggered flip-flop; CL: Combinatorial Logic
60
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P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Describing Mitigation Effectiveness Using 
A Model
∝
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
Probability that an 
SEU in a DFF will 
manifest as an error 
in the next system 
clock cycle
Probability that an 
SET in a CL gate will 
manifest as an error 
in the next system 
clock cycle
DFF: Edge triggered flip-flop CL: Combinatorial Logic
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P(fs)error  Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Local Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR)
∝
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU0
Comb
Logic
Voter
Voter
Voter
LTMR
Comb
Logic
Comb
Logic
DFF
DFF
DFF
• Only DFFs are triplicated.  Data-paths are kept singular.
• LTMR masks upsets from DFFs and corrects DFF upsets if feedback is 
used.
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• Good for devices where DFFs are most 
susceptible and configuration and  CL 
susceptibility is insignificant; e.g., 
Microsemi ProASIC3.
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Windowed Shift Registers (WSRs): 
NEPP Test Structure
63
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Adding LTMR to a Microsemi ProASIC3 
Device versus RTAXs Embedded LTMR
• At lower LETs, applying LTMR 
to a ProASIC3 design, has 
similar (a little higher) SEU 
response to Microsemi RTAXs 
series.
• At higher LETs, clock tree 
upsets start to dominate and 
LTMR in the ProASIC3 is not 
as effective.  
• Depending on your target 
radiation environment, for 
most critical applications, the 
ProASIC3 SEU responses will 
produce acceptable upset 
rates.
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LET: linear energy transfer.
WSR: Test circuit…Windowed Shift Register.
INV: Inverters between WSR stages.
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ProASIC3: LTMR WSR 100MHz : 
Checkerboard Pattern
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RTAX4000D/RTAX2000 Shift Registers @ 80MHz
w/ checkerboard pattern
RTAX4000D WSR8I
RTAX4000D WSR0
RTAX2000v2 WSR8I
RTAX2000v2 WSR0_0
RTAX4000D INV=8
RTAX4 00D INV=0
RTAX2 00 INV=8
RTAX2000 INV=0
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LTMR Should Not Be Used in An 
SRAM Based FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Look Up Table: 
LUT
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Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Proven via NEPP experiments: SEU data for LTMR implemented in Xilinx 
FPGA devices are similar or worse than no added mitigation.
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Distributed Triple Modular Redundancy (DTMR)
DTMR
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
∝ Low Minimally Lowered
0 Low
Comb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
DFF
DFF
DFF
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• Triple all data-paths and add voters after DFFs.
• DTMR masks upsets from configuration + DFFs + CL and corrects 
captured upsets if feedback is used.
• Good for devices where configuration or DFFs + CL are more 
susceptible than project requirements; e.g., Xilinx and Altera 
commercial FPGAs.
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Xilinx Kintex UltraScale Mitigation Study: 8-bit 
Counters
67
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To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16th – September 21st , 2018
P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Global Triple Modular Redundancy (GTMR)
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
∝
Low Lowered
Comb
Logic
GTMR Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter Voter
Voter
Voter
DFF
DFF
DFFComb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
Low Low
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• Triple all clocks, data-paths and add voters after DFFs.
• GTMR has the same level of protection as DTMR; however, it also 
protects clock domains.
• Good for devices where configuration or DFFs + CL are more 
susceptible than project requirements; e.g., Xilinx and Altera 
commercial FPGAs.
Low
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Theoretically, GTMR Is The Strongest 
Mitigation Strategy… BUT…
• Triplicating a design and its global routes takes up a 
lot of power and area.
• Generally performed after synthesis by a tool– not 
part of RTL.
• Skew between clock domains must be minimized such 
that it is less than the shortest routing delay from DFF 
to DFF (hold time violation or race condition):
– Does the FPGA contain enough low skew clock 
trees? (each clock + its synchronized reset)x3.
– Limit skew of clocks coming into the FPGA.
– Limit skew of clocks from their input pin to their 
clock tree.
• Difficult to verify.
69
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Kintex-7 Counter Heavy-Ion Results:
GTMR Does Not Perform Well – Clock Skew
70
Low LET: GTMR ≅ DTMR…
And is a decade better than 
No TMR
LET >5MeVcm2/mg: GTMR ≅ No 
TMR…
And is a decade worse than DTMR
DTMR strength decreased due to clock SETs 
that occur at higher clock tree leaves.
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Comparison of V5QV and Kintex
UltraScale with Mitigation
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Warning
• There are significant differences between TMR schemes.  
Select the correct type for your application and 
requirements.
• Do not use LTMR in a Xilinx Device!
• BTMR is a sufficient mitigation strategy if the required 
reliability window is relatively small as compared to 
MTTF of a non-redundant (non-mitigated) system.
• Clock skew with GTMR can reduce mitigation strength.  
Best to stay away.
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TMR and Verification
• If a system is required to be protected using triple 
modular redundancy (TMR), improper insertion 
can jeopardize the reliability and security of the 
system.  
• Due to the complexity of the verification process 
and the complexity of digital designs, there are 
currently no available techniques that can 
provide complete and reliable confirmation of 
TMR insertion.  
• Can you trust that TMR has been inserted as 
expected (correct topological scheme) and has 
not broken existing logic during the insertion 
process?
73
We are working on it!
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TMR Rules of Thumb
• FPGAs with embedded mitigation do not usually require 
additional  (user inserted) TMR.
• FPGAs with soft configuration will only benefit from DTMR or 
BTMR (in appropriate situations).
• FPGAs with hard configuration and no other embedded 
mitigation will benefit from local mitigation strategies.
• Most FPGAs cannot accommodate the clock skew between 
clock trees to properly implement GTMR.
74
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Some Thoughts
75
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Concerns and Challenges of Today and 
Tomorrow for Mitigation Insertion (1)
• User insertion of mitigation strategies in most FPGA and ASIC 
devices has proven to be a challenging task because of 
reliability, performance, area, and power constraints.
– Difficult to synchronize across triplicated systems,
– Mitigation insertion slows down the system.
– Can’t fit a triplicated version of a design into one device.
– Power and thermal hot-spots are increased.
• The newer commercial devices have a significant increase in gate 
count and lower power.  This helps to accommodate for area and 
power constraints while triplicating a design.  However, this 
increases the challenge of module synchronization.
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Concerns and Challenges of Today and 
Tomorrow for Mitigation Insertion (2)
• Embedded mitigation has helped in the design process.  However, 
it is proving to be an ever-increasing challenge for manufacturers.
– We (users) want embedded systems: cheaper, faster, and less power 
hungry.
– However, heritage has proven that for critical applications, embedded 
systems have provided excellent performance and reliability.
• Tool availability… Getting better… IP Cores are still problematic.
• User’s are not selecting the correct mitigation scheme for their 
target FPGA.
• Mitigation is too complex to fully verify.
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Warning
• You should not mitigate failure mechanisms that 
have insignificant contribution to the overall 
failure rate:
– This adds risk.
– Slows down system.
– Can provide a false sense of protection.
– Gain is not significant.
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Summary
• For critical applications, mitigation might be required.
• Determine the correct mitigation scheme for your mission while 
incorporating given requirements:
– Understand the susceptibility of the target FPGA and 
potential necessity of other devices.
– Investigate if the selected mitigation strategy is compatible to 
the target FPGA device.
– Calculate the reliability of the mitigation strategy to determine 
if the final system will satisfy requirements.
– Ask the right questions regarding functional expectation, 
mitigation, requirement satisfaction, and verification of 
expectations.
• Although it is desirable from a user’s perspective to have 
embedded mitigation, cost seems to be driving the market 
towards unmitigated commercial FPGA devices.  Hence, it will be 
necessary for user’s to familiarize themselves with optimal 
mitigation insertion and usage.
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